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Abstract
Concerns about conflicts of interest in commercially funded research have gener-
ated increasing disclosure requirements, but are these enough to assess influence? 
Using the Coca-Cola Company as an example, we explore its research agreements 
to understand influence. Freedom of Information requests identified 87,013 pages of 
documents, including five agreements between Coca-Cola and public institutions in 
the United States, and Canada. We assess whether they allowed Coca-Cola to exer-
cise control or influence. Provisions gave Coca-Cola the right to review research in 
advance of publication as well as control over (1) study data, (2) disclosure of results 
and (3) acknowledgement of Coca-Cola funding. Some agreements specified that 
Coca-Cola has the ultimate decision about any publication of peer-reviewed papers 
prior to its approval of the researchers’ final report. If so desired, Coca-Cola can 
thus prevent publication of unfavourable research, but we found no evidence of this 
to date in the emails we received. The documents also reveal researchers can negoti-
ate with funders successfully to remove restrictive clauses on their research. We rec-
ommend journals supplement funding disclosures and conflict-of-interest statements 
by requiring authors to attach funder agreements.
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Introduction
In the wake of criticisms about a lack of transparency of financial support for medi-
cal and scientific research, several multinational corporations (MNCs) recently com-
mitted to publishing relevant information on the scale and nature of their invest-
ments in research, publishing lists of projects they fund and developing principles 
to apply to their relationship with researchers. But are these measures sufficient to 
disclose the potentially complex nature of these relationships and associated con-
tractual obligations?
To answer this question, we have undertaken a case study about one of the cor-
porations that seeks to position itself at the forefront of this process, The Coca-Cola 
Company. The company is an appropriate example to study because, following criti-
cism of its activities, it has published a ‘Transparency List’ of researchers whom it 
funded from 2010 to 2017. It also progressively refined an explicit set of principles 
for the researchers it funds, providing a basis for comparing its stated intentions and 
its practice. In 2016, it brought together its principles formally [1]. It also released 
the list of partnerships and research funding with an explicit statement that those 
researchers that it funded on the list were:
(1) “expected to conduct research that is factual, transparent and designed objec-
tively”;
(2) to have “full control of the study design, the execution and the collection, analy-
sis and interpretation of the data”;
(3) “encouraged to publish” and
(4) “expected to disclose their funding sources in all publications and public presen-
tations of the data”. It added that the company did not “have the right to prevent 
the publication of research results” and that funding was not “conditioned on 
the outcome of the research”.[2]
These four major assertions provide a base for comparing Coca-Cola’s stated 
intentions to its actual practices. We see on Coca-Cola’s own website that it makes 
these claim around its research funded since 2010 [2](Fig. 1):
At least on the surface, these principles conflict with anecdotal reports of the 
corporation’s activities following their publication. As one example, in 2015, 
a New York Times exposé revealed that Coca-Cola designed its funding of the 
Global Energy Balance Network (GEBN) to divert attention from the role that 
sugar-sweetened beverages play in the obesity epidemic by excessively emphasis-
ing the role of lack of exercise [3]. The Times article asserted that Coca-Cola, just 
like Big Tobacco, had sought to influence public health and medical research-
ers, and to deploy them to promote the Company’s agenda, even though some of 
these researchers reported the funding to be ‘unrestricted’, meaning that it can be 
used for any purpose or by an organisation, rather than being given for a specific 
project or purpose [3, 4]. GEBN was subsequently closed in November 2015, on 
which Coca-Cola declined to comment [5]. A 2019 article revealed Coca-Cola’s 
funding of bodies like the International Life Sciences Institute in China, showing 
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how the latter organisation is deployed to shape obesity science and related policy 
[6, 7]. A feature in the British Medical Journal suggested also that the transpar-
ency list was incomplete, and highlighted how Coca-Cola acts to exercise ‘soft 
power’ by using its funding to influence everything from conferences to aca-
demic positions [8]. So how can these pieces of information be reconciled? Does 
Coca-Cola really uphold its public commitments on research funding? Have its 
grants—past and present—really allowed researchers to operate free from influ-
ence as Coca-Cola suggests on its website?
Here, we seek evidence supporting or rejecting Coca-Cola’s four major 
research principles detailed above, using information obtained from United States 
(US) state and federal, as well as Australian, British, Canadian and Danish Free-
dom of Information (FOI) requests for communications between Coca-Cola and 
leading public health academics or federal or state agency employees who were 
known to receive funding from or to collaborate with the company. Our FOI 
requests yielded a large volume of material on Coca-Cola’s engagement in public 
health-related issues. These include five agreements between researchers or their 
host organisation and Coca-Cola, plus a large amount of related correspondence 
that enables us to assess whether these principles were being observed previously 
as asserted, and are now being upheld in relations with researchers. We look both 
at the legal (or de jure) aspects of the agreements and how they were operational-
ised in practice in the relationships with researchers (de facto).
Fig. 1  [2]
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Methods
A non-profit consumer and public health research group in the United States, U.S. 
Right to Know (USRTK), based in Oakland, California, investigates the food and 
agrichemical industries, examining their public relations, political and lobbying 
campaigns, as well as the health risks associated with their products [9]. (One 
author, GR, is a co-director of USRTK). Drawing on the approach used in past 
studies of corporate behaviour and related litigation [10], between 2015 and 2018, 
USRTK sent 129 FOI requests to United States (US), Australian, British, Cana-
dian and Danish public bodies related to Coca-Cola’s links with public health 
actors, including academics. USRTK selected the higher education institutions 
because they were governed by FOI laws (that exist in many jurisdictions around 
the world to encourage openness and transparency by public bodies, including at 
the state and federal level in the US, as well as in Australia, Britain, Canada and 
Denmark where USRTK also sent requests), or because USRTK identified these 
institutions as having received funding from Coca-Cola through its recent public 
disclosures [2].
The responses yielded 87,013 pages of documents, including five research 
agreements made with Louisiana State University [11, 12], University of South 
Carolina [13], University of Toronto [14] and the University of Washington [15]. 
The research team archived the FOI responses using document discovery soft-
ware used across the legal services industry, extracted the research agreement and 
then two members of the research team read the documents to assess the concord-
ance between Coca-Cola’s principles detailed above. One of these researchers is 
trained as a lawyer (SS) and the other is a public health researcher (DS).
Inevitably, the sample has potential limitations to its external validity. First, 
the sample is not comprehensive, as redactions and removal of some emails 
from the batch are allowed in line with certain legislative exemptions, and it is 
impossible to ascertain whether FOI responses form a complete sample of com-
munications and other contractual documents between Coca-Cola and associ-
ated researchers. As with a small number of cases, quantitative study was not 
feasible, we thematically and legally evaluated the agreements by testing whether 
there existed evidence to confirm or refute Coca-Cola’s four major assertions on 
research transparency and independence of researchers. To limit the scope for 
personal biases in interpretation, the entire research team engaged in reflexivity, 
reviewing the selection and interpretation of the source material. Second, the five 
research agreements pre-date Coca-Cola’s publication of its transparency princi-
ples in 2016, although its own website states that all of the disclosed health and 
well-being research complied with these four assertions. Furthermore, several 
researchers themselves publicly claim that the funding had no influence on their 
research, which we examine more fully below [16]. Third, we report extracts as 
they appear in the agreements and quote any related emails “in their own words” 
to allow readers to assess critically our interpretations. To ensure reproducibility 
of our study, all agreements and cited communications are posted on Internet.
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Results
We summarise our findings in as they pertain to each of Coca-Cola’s four major 
research transparency assertions [2].
Assertion 1  Researchers retain full control over the design, execution, analysis and 
interpretation of research
The documents obtained by FOI indicate that, although it does not have the 
capacity to direct and control the day-to-day conduct of studies, Coca-Cola retains 
varied rights throughout the research process, including the power to terminate stud-
ies early without giving reasons. Several agreements reveal that the company main-
tains the right to receive and comment on research prior to submission for publi-
cation. However, the researchers may reject these changes. Thus, the company can 
influence but not direct the research output, but may use termination provisions as a 
mechanism to discontinue research.
The emails we obtained reveal that academic partners recognise Coca-Cola’s 
influence on the research it funds, even where it is not directing the research. For 
example, Tommy Coggins, Director of University of South Carolina’s (USC) Spon-
sored Award Management and Research Compliance, in an email to Professor Tom 
Chandler of USC’s Norman J. Arnold School of Public Health, explained that sev-
eral of the research agreements entered into at the University allowed Coca-Cola to 
have:
a substantial say in how it [the research] was conducted and how results are 
handled, including ownership of all IP. None of this is wrong or unusual, but it 
is a typical industry research agreement. Also, contains a good bit of language 
about confidentiality and sharing results with Coca-Cola, but no bar on publi-
cation [17].
Coggins was commenting on a study that aimed to uncover the “extent to which var-
iation in total energy expenditure and variation in total energy intake contribute to 
changes in body weight and fat among young adults”. The agreements we obtained 
specify that Coca-Cola’s comments are non-binding unless its suggested revisions to 
drafts pertain to information covered in the confidentiality provisions in the agree-
ment, under which Coca-Cola retains the right to redact content accordingly.
Taking a specific example, as part of the “Sponsored Clinical Trial Research 
Agreement” between Coca-Cola and the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State 
University, represented by Pennington Biomedical Research Center (PBRC), we find 
a 2012 research agreement for a study with Timothy Church as Principal Investiga-
tor related to fluid balance and performance with ad  libitum water, flavoured pla-
cebo or carbohydrate-electrolyte beverage intake during exercise in the heat (known 
henceforth as the “The APEX Study”) [18]. The contract sets out mutual obliga-
tions of all parties as including regular reports to and data sharing with Coca-Cola, 
as well as the standard termination provision, which allows Coca-Cola to retain all 
data. Article 6.1 specifies:
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Publication prior to delivery of the final report of any information gained in 
the course of performing the Project must be in a peer reviewed journal, must 
be approved in writing by both parties prior to such publication, and must 
acknowledge that the Study was funded by The Coca-Cola Company. Notwith-
standing the foregoing, the Sponsor will not be approving the content of the 
publication, but has a right to review and provide comment before submission 
for publication [12].
Thus, while Coca-Cola contends that its guidance is not tantamount to approval, it 
does retain the right to comment on papers prior to publication, and holds the ability 
to terminate studies at any time without reasons.
Indeed, Coca-Cola may simply terminate an agreement if the findings are not 
in its interests or if its comments and revisions are rejected. Such provisions do, 
however, vary amongst the research agreements we obtained. As one example, we 
show a “Research Agreement” between Coca-Cola and the South Carolina Research 
Foundation, a non-profit entity that accepts donations for USC, to fund a study enti-
tled “Energy Balance” in 2010–2015. Section “Discussion” of the agreement pro-
vides that Coca-Cola can make non-binding suggestions and may only redact infor-
mation covered by its confidentiality provisions in Section “Results”. According to 
Section “Results”, “Confidential Information” includes disclosures made “orally or 
in writing” pertaining to “technical or business information regarding the Sponsor’s 
products, marketing plans, public relations plans or Protocol”. Notably, this agree-
ment empowers Coca-Cola to terminate the agreement with notice and to require the 
return or destruction of all of this Confidential Information. Specifically, Section 6.2 
states that, as long as 15 days written notice is given and with no need to give a 
reason:
6.3.4: SCRF shall immediately discontinue any work and shall take such pre-
cautions as requested by Sponsor, including returning to Sponsor or certifying 
in writing to Sponsor that it had destroyed all documents and other tangible 
items containing Sponsor Confidential Information [13].
Other agreements contain provisions that do allow for recall of all research docu-
ments and materials on termination. In the Church APEX study, detailed above, the 
termination provisions of this agreement are stronger, stating in Article 4.4 that:
Upon receipt of a notice of early termination, PBRC will immediately discon-
tinue all work under this Agreement and return all copies of Sponsor data, or 
other materials, and deliver to sponsor all work in progress, including incom-
plete work… [12]
Such termination provisions could, hypothetically, allow Coca-Cola to quash stud-
ies progressing unfavourably, or allow Coca-Cola to pressure researchers using the 
threat of termination. However, we found no evidence that this has occurred in our 
FOI batches. In one instance, we did find Coca-Cola had ended a study with little or 
no information being sent to researchers or their institutions. For example, emails 
between researchers at USC pertaining to the Active Healthy Living Programme 
funded by Coca-Cola, state:
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As you know, the contract with Coca-Cola to develop and evaluate the 
Active Healthy Living Program has terminated. While I am not sure, 
because they have not communicated with us in several months, it appears 
that Coca-Cola has dropped the program. We put a lot into development of 
the program, and if possible, I would like to obtain/retain the intellectual 
property. Please look into where we stand with this, and let’s figure out next 
steps. Thanks [19].
Our FOI, however, does indicate that Coca-Cola may be willing to negotiate the 
terms of agreements to moderate language regarding pre-publication communica-
tion and consultation with Coca-Cola. In emails between University of Toronto Pro-
fessor John Sievenpiper and Coca-Cola’s Susan Roberts regarding a proposed, then 
signed, research agreement, Sievenpiper requests revision of provisions he regards 
as restrictive. The original text, which Sievenpiper requests to be deleted in its 
entirety, states:
U of T will afford TCCC [The Coca-Cola Company] the prior right to review 
and approve (or reject) any communication or other material developed by 
U of T or its employees, contractors or agents discussing this Agreement or 
the underlying grant, the related work or accomplishments of U of T and/or 
TCCC, or any related or other association between U of T and TCCC, or oth-
erwise mentioning TCCC’s name or displaying TCCC’s trademarks [14].
Sievenpiper comments that it is “very restrictive for being an ‘unrestricted grant’”, 
and Coca-Cola agreed to change the wording to “consult with each other in good 
faith regarding any communication with third party/ies…”. This involved significant 
back and forth emails and discussion, suggesting that the original wording may be 
standard wording in other Coca-Cola research agreements.
Assertion 2  Researchers are encouraged to publish and Coca-Cola does not have 
the right to prevent the publication of research results
Our research confirms that Coca-Cola encourages researchers to publish in peer-
reviewed publications and generally only retains limited rights to delay publication 
to protect its proprietary interests or to obtain a patent. However, many agreements 
contain the above-discussed termination provisions, allowing either fixed-notice 
period termination, or early termination according to the agreement’s terms (as 
described above), some restricting publication following such a termination.
For example, in the agreement pertaining to Church’s APEX study, Article 
6.1, provided above in full, states that publication “must be in a peer reviewed 
journal, must be approved in writing by both parties prior to such publication, 
and must acknowledge that the Study was funded by The Coca-Cola Company”. 
While this indicates that Coca-Cola does encourage publication as it states, and 
does not have a right to prevent publication, only providing comments, Article 
6.2 makes clear that Coca-Cola can issue a written notice to require a delay to 
publishing where its proprietary interests are at stake; but there is no general right 
to control publication of results unfavourable to Coca-Cola’s commercial interests 
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[12.] The provisions do, however, convey a right of Coca-Cola to comment and 
prompt revisions, as discussed above.
Similar provisions are found in a “Research Agreement” between Coca-Cola 
and the South Carolina Research Foundation [13]. Section “Discussion” on “Pub-
lication Rights and Use of Project Results” states similarly that Coca-Cola can 
require a delay where it wishes to file a patent or protect its proprietary inter-
ests, and that such a delay should not exceed 120 days. Retention of a capacity to 
delay publication is consonant with ordinary industry-funded research provisions, 
but in public health research it may delay significant findings from reaching the 
public.
Notably, the APEX study agreement does not contain provisions that allow 
Coke to prevent publication absolutely, but does require written permission for 
publication of all peer-reviewed publications where such publication would be 
prior to the final report to Coca-Cola (Art 6.2). This, in concert with the ter-
mination provisions that require cessation of research and the full and complete 
handover of all study documents, may enable Coca-Cola to shape unfavourable 
findings in advance of publication (Art 4.4). Thus, while Coca-Cola cannot stop 
publication, termination provisions could allow it to prevent publication through 
termination and recall of documents, along with the written consent requirement 
obligation in Article 6.2. Notably, this provision only has effect prior to the report 
to Coca-Cola, and thereby is not absolute in its effect. The agreements themselves 
are unclear as to the nature of the required reports and whether they will be made 
public and subject to peer review.
Assertion 3  Researchers are expected to disclose their funding sources in all publi-
cations and public presentations of the data
We found that the agreements identified in our study routinely allow for the attri-
bution that a study, paper or report was “funded by The Coca-Cola Company”. 
For example, Article 6.3 of the research agreement between Coca-Cola and the 
South Carolina Research Foundation states:
Publication shall acknowledge authorship according to generally accepted 
criteria for authorship and subject to journal requirements, if applicable. 
PBRC agrees that if Sponsor so requests, and only if Sponsor requests, sub-
stantive releases and/or written reports contemplated by this Article 6 may 
include language to the effect that, “The Study was funded by The Coca-
Cola Company” [13].
Notably, the phrasing “PBRC agrees that if Sponsor so requests, and only if 
Sponsor requests…” does not grant the University the right to use this attribution 
on all outputs. However, the peer-review provisions in Article 6 seem to imply 
that Coca-Cola expects the disclosure of funding sources in publications, as this 
is routine practice amongst reputable journals. The provision extends to publicity 
related to the research, placing the funding attribution within the hands of Coca-
Cola rather than with the host or researcher. The contracts allow for a funding 
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declaration to be phrased in a way that does not extend to a complete and detailed 
declaration of Coca-Cola’s input into the research, although the agreements are 
silent as to whether more robust statements are allowed.
Assertion 4  Coca-Cola does not make funding conditioned on the outcome of the 
research
The research agreements contain no provisions on any outcomes of any study. How-
ever, as noted above, this could hypothetically be exercised through the termination 
provision. Thus, while we found no direct conditions pertaining to outcomes of the 
research, the effect of permissive termination provisions and recall of data provi-
sions could indirectly have a ‘chilling effect ‘on researcher’s work, influencing what 
researchers conclude. Past research has revealed that researchers do strive to main-
tain positive relations with Coca-Cola and produce results favourable to them [20].
Discussion
Our review of Coca-Cola’s research agreements reveals that it uses terms in line with 
standard funding agreements seen with other corporate actors. Specifically, these 
contractual agreements contain no provisions granting the company absolute control 
over the studies it funds, but they could allow it to assert influence over studies and 
resultant publications. We found that Coca-Cola requires regular reports and input 
into projects, and maintains the ability to terminate agreements early and without 
reason. Of course, in some cases such early termination provisions are justifiable; 
for example, when there is improper behaviour like harassment or bullying, a failure 
to deliver work in accord with the contract or the other such examples, which tend 
to be given as reasons for termination. In contrast, the contractual  terms  for early 
termination without reasons are arguably beyond the legal scope needed to address 
such justifiable concerns,  although they are not uncommon in commercial agree-
ments generally and there is no evidence of their use in our batch. In light of past 
evidence of ‘soft influence’, whereby researchers sought to please funders in ways 
which, albeit not contractually specified, in practice operated to the same effect, the 
company’s continued input and early termination provisions undermine its public 
assertions of researcher independence [20].
Before interpreting the implications of our study for research, policy and improv-
ing management of COIs, we must acknowledge several limitations. First, our case 
studies focused on Coca-Cola may not generalise to other segments of food and 
beverage industries. However, the contractual agreements appear to be commonly 
employed between private actors and public researchers. Second, several recipients 
of USRTK’s FOI requests returned or did not respond to them, or, in some cases, 
they redacted material submitted. It is possible that we have been unable to detect 
contracts, which may have existed but were not obtainable through FOI, thus creat-
ing an omission bias in our analysis. The direction of such bias, however, would 
likely be to hide particularly egregious contracts. Third, despite a large docu-
ment set, we only identified five research contracts. There may be heterogeneity in 
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Coca-Cola’s contracts with researchers given our observations that researchers could 
negotiate their terms. That said, there was relatively limited variation across the five 
agreements.
Our research reveals a need to improve reporting of COIs. Many declarations of 
funding and routinely employed COI statements fail to specify the true amount of 
input and influence Coca-Cola has (irrespective of whether it chooses to exercise it). 
While it is beyond the scope of our study to review all Coca-Cola funded research, 
we note that concerns have been raised elsewhere about the completeness of COIs 
in studies funded by Coca-Cola on topics of nutrition and physical inactivity [21]. 
Examples include publications arising from the Energy Balance grant at USC state 
“Supported by an unrestricted research grant from The Coca-Cola Company” [22]. 
Stephen Blair, one of the leads at USC, records that he has received funding from 
Coca-Cola, amongst others, in the preceding 5 years, as does co-author Gregory 
Hand. However, nowhere in the article is there a statement setting out the nature and 
amount of input Coca-Cola had, only that the funding was “unrestricted”, which, 
as the email discussions between Coggins and Chandler indicate, was not how the 
grant was understood by USC. Coggins, as Director of Sponsored Award Manage-
ment and Research Compliance at USC, makes clear the “the Energy Flux and Bal-
ance studies were conducted under the terms of Research Agreement with SCRF… 
[and] are not “un-restricted”…” [17]. Such attributions of funding are similarly 
made with regards to the results of Timothy Church’s APEX study, and are a reflec-
tive example of the agreement provisions regarding funding statements across the 
agreements we received and resultant publications [23, 24].
Our research points to particular concerns about early termination provisions. 
The termination provisions in some of the agreements that allow Coca-Cola to 
discontinue the studies it funds if results are unfavourable, in contrast to the assur-
ances it makes on its website about not being able to prevent publication, should be 
cause of concern. Although not all agreements we reviewed allow for full recall of 
research documents and materials, we identified several agreements that in effect 
allow Coca-Cola to terminate a study, if the findings are unfavourable to Coca-
Cola. We observed push-back by researchers receiving unrestricted grants regard-
ing restrictive provisions, revealing that the researchers were aware that there could 
be a problem. Coca-Cola was receptive to requested revision, but this may be due 
to the ongoing relationship the Company had with this particular researcher. Cer-
tainly, some of the agreements allow for unfavourable developments or findings to 
be quashed prior to publication. Future research will be needed to identify when 
and the extent to which funded studies were not published. This is but one source of 
potential ‘publication bias’, whereby only positive results are made publicly visible. 
Given the hidden nature of unpublished, funded studies, this is an extremely chal-
lenging area of research as there is no way for researchers to ascertain who produced 
the studies, why they remain unpublished and what their results may be.
We acknowledge that many provisions in Coca-Cola’s research funding agree-
ments are standard, including its early termination provisions. While recent ter-
mination of a non-industry-funded United Kingdom study due to findings of bul-
lying by a primary investigator evidences how these provisions may be exercised 
to encourage positive research environments [25], we note that early termination 
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may be used to discontinue studies in a less positive way. We found evidence that 
in at least one study Coca-Cola discontinued funding, seemingly without reason 
given to those involved, but found no evidence that this related to unfavourable 
findings or prospective publications. We did find evidence suggesting that Coca-
Cola exerts influence on the design, conduct and write-up of studies, retaining 
rights to comment and have input throughout the research process.
Turning to implications for COIs, this study adds to a growing body of litera-
ture of their limited usefulness. Qualitative studies with researchers reveal diverse 
interpretations of what COIs and influence mean [26]. It is also easy for COIs to 
be inadequately reported. Most of what is detected comes to us through journalis-
tic exposés [27]. Our study adds to these insights, showing that such general (and 
notably brief) declarations may fail to capture Coca-Cola’s full involvement in the 
studies they fund, from design through to publication.
To remedy these weaknesses, we propose far more ‘hard’ information about 
funding, rather than relying on self-reports. Specifically, we call for journals to 
require authors receiving Coca-Cola or other industry financial support to pro-
vide more robust COI and funding statements, including declaring the specifics 
of input allowed in the study’s research agreements. In addition, journals should 
require authors of funded research to upload the research agreements for studies 
as appendices to any peer-reviewed publication, allowing these to be published 
with ease and at little expense on the existing electronic platforms where sup-
plemental information is commonly provided. A reader’s appraisal of a study’s 
scientific objectivity would best be supported by knowledge that Coca-Cola has 
input at various stages of the research and publication processes, an understand-
ing facilitated by access to the research agreement governing the study.
For medical and public health professionals, the lack of robust information on 
the details of input by industry and on studies terminated before results enter the 
public realm makes it impossible to know how much of the research that enters 
the public realm reflects industry positions and content, as opposed to fully 
unbiased and uninfluenced research results. It is critical that professionals and 
scholars be able to appraise influence. We know that people trust studies with an 
industry partner less and approach these studies with greater suspicion about bias 
[28]. Greater information is needed to appraise influence.
Where studies are terminated without having been registered in advance, as 
should be the case with clinical trials, it may be that termination acts as sup-
pression of critical health information. We therefore call for industry funders to 
publish complete lists of terminated studies as part of their commitment to act 
with integrity, and for clear declarations of involvement as standard publication 
practice.
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Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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